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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
award in lieu of homestead to ten thousand dollars.' s Although the
value of the homestead exemption has not, as yet, been changed, and
remains six thousand dollars, 9 there is a provision in the new probate
code that, if the value of the homestead is less than ten thousand
dollars, the court shall award additional property so that the total
shall equal ten thousand dollars.2" Thus, in situations similar to the
principal case, the fact that the homestead value is lower than the
award in lieu of homestead would not be significant because of the
award in addition to homestead. There is, however, no reason for the
variance, and the legislature should act to equalize the values.
EFFECT OF CONFLICTING "OTHER
INSURANCE" CLAUSES
Plaintiff was seriously injured when an automobile in which she
was a passenger collided with another vehicle driven by an uninsured
operator. Plaintiff's automobile insurance policy, issued by defendant,
included coverage for bodily injury caused by uninsured motorists.
Excluded from this coverage, however, was injury sustained in an
automobile not owned by plaintiff, if the owner had "similar insurance"
which was available to plaintiff.' The owner of the automobile in
which plaintiff was injured also carried insurance containing uninsured
motorist coverage. His policy, written by another company, contained
a pro rata clause restricting coverage to a proportionate share of the
loss if the insured had other similar insurance available.2 Being an
"insured" by definition, plaintiff received the maximum payment under
the latter policy, but defendant denied liability because of its policy's
"WASH. IEv. CODE § 11.52.010 (1965).
WASH. REV. CODE § 6.12.050 (1956).
"WASH. REV. CODE § 11.52.022 (1965).
'The exclusionary, or "escape" clause, read as follows, 66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 858,
405 P.2d at 713:
This Section of the Policy does not apply: 1. to bodily injury of an insured
sustained while in or upon, entering into or alighting from, any automobile, if
the owner has insurance similar to that afforded by this Section and such in-
surance is available to the insured....
'This pro rata clause read as follows, 66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 858-59, 405 P.2d at 713:
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the insured has other similar
insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the damages shall be
deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this
insurance and such other insurance, and the Company shall not be liable for a
greater proportion of any loss to which this Uninsured Motorists Coverage
applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable
limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance.
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exclusion. Plaintiff sought a judgment declaring that defendant's pol-
icy be interpreted to provide primary insurance coverage or, in the
alternative, excess coverage over and above any other available insur-
ance2 The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court affirmed. Held: Availability of an insurance
policy containing a pro rata clause effectuates the escape clause of
another policy which denies coverage or liability if other similar in-
surance is available. Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 66 Wash. Dec. 2d
857, 405 P.2d 712 (1965).
In response to the public's growing need for broader protection,
automobile liability insurers now offer expanded coverage to prospec-
tive purchasers.4 As a result, a particular loss or injury may be cov-
ered by more than one insurance policy.' To avoid concurrent or
"double" coverage, "other insurance" clauses are often found in in-
surance policies.0 These clauses are generally classified as escape,1
excess,5 or pro rata clauses. Conflicts arise, however, when each of
two applicable insurance policies purports to restrict or terminate
Plaintiff alleged damages not in excess of $32,000, and both policies limited
liability to $10,000.
' See generally Grad, Recent Developments in, Automobile Accident Compensation,
50 COLUm. L. R~v. 300 (1950).
The scope of coverage has been expanded by "omnibus," "drive-other-car," "hired
car," "non-ownership," and "substitute car" clauses, and other common provisions.
Furthermore, many persons, organizations, and automobiles not described in an
insurance policy may be included as insureds although the named insured alone
assumes the premium obligations. See Gorton, A Further Study of the Effect of the
"Other Insurance" Provision Upon Automobile Liability Insurance, 16 INs. CouNsE.
J. 190 (1949) ; Note, Automobile Liability Insurance-Effect of Double Coverage and
"Other Insurance" Clauses, 38 MINN. L. REv. 838 (1954).
'See generally 8 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAw & PRAcTicE § 4911 (1962).7An escape clause provides that the policy affords no coverage at all when there
is other applicable insurance available. See, e.g., the following clause discussed in
Continental Cas. Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 94 F.2d 710, 711 (3d Cir. 1938) : "If
any person... is, under the terms of this policy, entitled to be indemnified there-
under and is also covered by other valid and collectable insurance, such other person
... shall not be indemnified under this policy."
'The typical excess clause provides that the insurer's liability shall be only the
amount by which the loss exceeds the coverage of all other available insurance, up
to the limits of the excess policy. See, e.g., the following clause discussed in Cimar-
ron Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 224 Ore. 57, 355 P.2d 742, 750 (1960): "If the
insured has other insurance against a loss covered by this policy, the insurance under
this policy shall be excess over any other valid and collectible insurance available to
the insured."
'A pro rata clause provides that the insurer will pay only a prorated share of the
loss, usually in the proportion which its policy limit bears to the aggregate limits
of all other valid and collectable insurance. See, e.g., the clause discussed in Wood-
rich Constr. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 252 Minn. 86, 89 N.W.2d 412, 422 (1959):
If the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by this policy, the
company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater proportion of such loss
than the applicable limit of liability stated in the Declarations bears to the total




liability for a particular risk in the event that there is other insurance
available.
In most cases, such a conflict causes one insurer to sue the other
to obtain contribution or to determine their respective liabilities to
a common insured. The principal case is unusual, besides being of
first impression, because the contest was between an insured and one
of two insurers. As a consequence, the court was able to treat the
case as a question of interpretation of the parties' contract. The
contract's escape clause absolved defendant from liability if plaintiff
could recover under "insurance similar to that afforded"' by defend-
ant's policy. The court proceeded to define "similar" as not synony-
mous with "identical," but meaning "a general resemblance in the
essential elements."' 1 Because plaintiff was covered by two policies
providing "the same amount of insurance to the same beneficiaries for
the same injuries caused by the same type of automobiles,"' 2 defendant
was held exempt from liability pursuant to its insurance contract.
The court went on to state that the better rule gives effect to an
escape clause at the expense of a pro rata clause when the two con-
flict. As a result, insurance with a pro rata clause is considered similar
to escape clause insurance, but the converse is not true. The court
emphasized, however, that this case was a suit between an insured
and her insurer, not two insurance companies, and involved uninsured
motorist coverage, not ordinary liability policies. What the result
would have been without these factors present was left open to con-
jecture.
As stated by the court, the principal case falls within "an area of
law which is nebulous, unsettled, and devoid of uniformity or agree-
ment."'3 Courts have used several methods to resolve conflicts between
"other insurance" clauses. They include the "prior in time" theory,
giving effect to the clause in the later issued policy; 4 the "specific
" See note 1 supra.
" 66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 861, 405 P.2d at 714.
2Ibid.
166 Wash. Dec. 2d at 859, 405 P.2d at 713. See Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958, 959-60 (9th Cir. 1952).
" The reasoning is that, since no other insurance existed when the first policy
was issued, its clause is ineffective and the second policy's clause must control. See,
e.g, New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 108 F.2d 653 (6th
Cir. 1940). Ignored, however, is the fact that neither clause can take effect until the
moment of loss or injury, and at that time both policies are in force. See Russ,
The Double Insurance Proble=--A Proposal, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 183, 184 (1961) ; Note,
Concurrent Coverage in Automobile Liability Insurance, 65 COLUm. L. Ray. 319, 321(1965) ; Note, 38 MINN. L. REv. 838, 845-47 (1954).
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versus general" theory, holding primarily liable the insurer whose
policy offers the most specific protection against the particular loss;"
and the "primary tortfeasor" theory, imposing primary liability upon
the insurer whose named insured is the primary tortfeasor.'6 These
formulas have proved unworkable, however, due to the increased com-
plexity of double coverage situations, and have been rejected by most
jurisdictions.17
Recently, the courts have developed a system of priorities by which
"other insurance" clauses are paired and one type of clause is favored
over another depending on the type of clause opposing it in the particu-
lar case. 8 The results are fairly uniform among jurisdictions if clauses
of the same type are involved. Courts will generally order proration
if both policies have pro rata clauses.' 9 Proration is usually the result,
also, when two excess clauses are opposed, since effect cannot be
given to both.2" The same result should occur when two escape clauses
are involved. 2' Less uniformity exists among jurisdictions, however,
when clauses of differing types are involved. Washington follows the
general rule which gives full effect to an excess clause when paired
with a pro rata clause, disregarding the latter.2 When an escape
clause is matched with an excess clause, the escape clause policy
" See, e.g., Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Cochran Mill &
Ginnery Co., 26 Ga. App. 288, 105 S.E. 856 (1921). This theory fails, however, when,
as in most cases, both insurers specifically cover the particular loss in question. See
Russ, supra note 14, at 185; Note, 65 CoLum. L. Rxv. 319, 321-22 (1965) ; Note, 38
MINN. L. REv. 838, 841-43 (1954).
" See, e.g., American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Mut. Indem. Co. 161 F.2d 62 (3d
Cir. 1947). This theory, however, fails to provide for a case in which the person
causing the loss or suffering the injury is an additional insured not named in either
policy. Moreover, it can not be applied to the problem presented by the principal case.
See Russ, supra note 14, at 184-85; Note, 65 COLUm. L. REv. 319, 322 (1965) ; Note,
38 MINN. L. REv. 838, 843-45 (1954).
7 See Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958, 960(9th Cir. 1952) ; Russ, supra note 14, at 185.
1 See Russ, supra note 14, at 186; Note, 65 COLUI. L. REv. 319, 321 n.16 (1965).
See generally Note, 28 IND. L.J. 429 (1953) ; Note, 38 MINN. L. Rtv. 838 (1954) ;
Note, 5 STAN. L. REv. 147 (1952) ; Note, 1 WrLLIA~M-rT LJ. 485 (1961) ; Annot., 46
A.L.R.2d 1163 (1956).
"E.g., Case v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 105 N.H. 422, 201 A.2d 897 (1964);
Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 611 (1952).
' E.g., Insurance Co. of Tex. v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 163 F. Supp. 143(S.D. Cal. 1958) ; Continental Cas. v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co. 75 Ohio L. Abs., 79,
143 N.E.2d 169 (C.P. 1957).
' There seems to be no American case reported, but see the English case of Weddel
v. Road Transp. & Gen. Ins. Co., [1932] 2 K.B. 563 (1931).
. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, Inc. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 66 Wash. Dec. 2d 33,
401 P.2d 205 (1965). Accord, Continental Cas. Co. v. American Fid. Ins. Co., 275
F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1960); Citizens Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
273 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1959); American Sur. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 934(4th Cir. 1958). Contra, Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110,
341 P.2d 110, modified, 219 Ore. 129, 346 P.2d 643 (1959) (proration ordered).
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is generally construed as primary insurance, holding the latter policy
liable only for any excess.2 3
The greatest uncertainty appears in the pro rata-versus-escape
clause situation, present in the principal case. Few courts have had
to resolve such a conflict. It seems certain that California,24 and per-
haps Oregon23 would give effect to the pro rata clause and not the
escape clause. Most commentators seem to favor proration in such
a situation." There are cases, however, in which the clauses were
held not mutually repugnant, and proration was rejected. 7 The re-
sult in these cases, giving effect to the escape clause, was purported
to rest on construction of the language in the policy.2" The pro rata
clause in the other policy was found not applicable because no other
insurance was considered available.
This system of matching or pairing "other insurance" clauses, how-
ever, appears as unsatisfactory as the earlier formulas. The courts
have not been able to offer any real justification for preferring one
type of clause over another. Furthermore, the system provides no
solution when more than two insurance policies are involved and each
has a different clause. A court in such a situation would have to
pick arbitrarily two clauses to compare first, thereafter proceeding
in a "round-robin" fashion. And, as admitted by the court in the
principal case, results under the priority system are usually based on
circular reasoning."
'E.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Suttenfield, 236 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Zurich
Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Michigan Alkali
Co. v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 103 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1939). Cntdra, Oregon Auto.
Ins. Co., v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952) (proration
ordered); Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Pacific Employers' Ins. Co., 102 Cal. App.
2d 188, 227 P.2d 53 (1951) (proration ordered).
2' Peerless Cas. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 144 Cal. App. 2d 617, 301 P.2d 602(1956) ; Air Transp. Mfg. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 91 Cal. App. 2d. 129,
204 P.2d 647 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
" Oregon would probably be in accord. See Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto.
Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110, 129, 341 P.2d 110, 119 (1959):
In our opinion, whether one policy used one clause or another, when any come
in conflict with the "other insurance" clauses of another insurer, regardless of
the nature of the clause, they are in fact repugnant and each should be rejected in
toto.
See Russ, supra note 14, at 191; Note, 65 CoLum. L. REV. 319, 332 (1965)
Note, 38 MIN,. L. REv. 838, 854 (1954); Note, 5 STAN. L. R-v. 147, 150 (1952);
Note, 1 WILLAmETTE L.J. 485, 487 n.22 (1961).
' McFarland v. Chicago Express, Inc., 200 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Burcham v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 255 Iowa 69, 121 N.W.2d 500 (1963). Cf. Motor Vehicle Cas.
Co. v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 254 Iowa 68, 116 N.W.2d 434 (1962).
' "It is clear the companies intended to sell less coverage and the insureds to buy
less coverage, 'while occupying an automobile not owned by a named insured."'
Burcham v. Farmers Ins. Exch., supra note 27, at 503.
'66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 862, 405 P.2d at 715, quoting Burcham v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 255 Iowa 69, 121 N.W.2d 500, 503 (1963) :
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A few suggestions have been made as possible solutions to conflicts
between "other insurance" clauses. One is to extend the trend de-
veloping in California and Oregon, and to have courts ignore the
clauses and order proration in all cases.3" Another suggestion is to
have insurers draft standard forms that clearly state how they in-
tend liability to be apportioned when "other insurance" clauses con-
flict. One commentator places a large part of the blame for the in-
creasing litigation in this area on the insurance industry for their
inaction." A legislative solution has been proposed which would gen-
erally outlaw escape and modified escape clauses, limit the use of
excess clauses, and favor the pro rata clause. 2
In any case, it should be made certain that the insured will not
receive less coverage than if he were protected by only one policy.
The coincidence of having two policies covering the same loss should
not cause a "forfeiture" but simply present the issue of apportion-
ment.33 The principal case indicates that the Washington court does
not favor wholesale proration, but will continue fixing responsibility
on one insurer or the other in appropriate cases.
QUASI-CONTRACTUAL RECOVERY WHEN MUNICIPAL
CONTRACT ULTRA VIRES
While plaintiff's shopping center was under construction, defendant
second-class municipality prepared for installation of a stop light to
aid traffic going to and from the center. A contractor was hired and
the design was approved, but funds were not budgeted for the project.
With the shopping center nearing completion, it was agreed that plain-
tiff would pay the cost of installation and defendant city would reim-
burse him out of the following year's budget. The city, without calling
for bids on the contract, hired a contractor and plaintiff paid the
cost of the traffic signal and its installation. In plaintiff's suit on
Though the reasoning may be criticized as circular and arbitrary, we believe
the better rule is that where the insurance companies would be both liable except
for the other, the excess-escape clause policy should be held to be not other
similar insurance to the policy containing the pro rata clause, conversely, the
policy with only its pro rata clause applicable is regarded as other similar in-
surance as used in the excess-escape policy.
'See Note, 38 IfiNN. L. REv. 838 (1954) ; Note, 1 WILLAmETmE L.J. 485 (1961).
" Note, 65 COLUTm. L. Rv. 319, 331-32 (1965).
"Russ, The Double Insurance Problenz--A Proposal, 13 HASTINGs L.J. 183, 191-93(1961).
' Note, 65 COLUm. L. REv. 319, 321 (1965).
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